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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1981 
_____________ 
 
KEVIN PATRICK WHEELER, 
                                                 Appellant 
v. 
 
CHAD WHEELER, Individually and in his official capacity  
as an officer of the Pennsylvania State Police, 
JOHN STRELISH, Individually and in his official capacity  
as an officer of the Pennsylvania State Police 
            
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00432) 
District Judge:  Hon. Karoline Mehalchick 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 19, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 20, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Kevin Wheeler appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We 
will affirm.  
I.  Background1  
 On July 26, 2012, Kevin Wheeler (“Wheeler”) was allegedly attacked by Chad 
Wheeler (“Chad”).2  As a result of the altercation, Wheeler sustained serious injuries.  
The Pennsylvania State Police initiated an investigation, and the trooper assigned to the 
case described the incident as an aggravated assault perpetrated by Chad.  At some point 
after that first assessment, responsibility for the investigation was transferred to Trooper 
John Strelish.  According to Wheeler, Strelish chose to ignore evidence about the nature 
of the incident, refused to return to the scene of the incident, refused to interview 
eyewitnesses “before they were ultimately intimidated,” refused to retrieve Wheeler’s 
medical records, and threatened to have Wheeler “evaluated” (presumably referring to a 
                                              
1 Because this case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, we accept the facts 
recited in the operative complaint as true, for purposes of appeal.  Kaymark v. Bank of 
Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015).        
 
2 Chad Wheeler is not a participant in this appeal.  All references to “Wheeler” are 
to the appellant, Kevin Wheeler.  While we do not mean to presume an undue familiarity, 
for simplicity and clarity we will refer to Chad Wheeler as “Chad.”  Although the shared 
last name of Kevin and Chad Wheeler suggests that they are related, the record provides 
no indication of the existence or nature of their relationship.  
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mental health evaluation) for inquiring into whether criminal charges would be brought 
against Chad.  (App. at 24a.)   
As a result of Strelish’s investigation, both parties to the altercation were charged 
in state court with simple assault and harassment.3  Following a preliminary hearing, 
Wheeler and Chad were scheduled to face formal arraignment and a further hearing in the 
Court of Common Pleas in Wayne County, Pennsylvania.  The prosecutor ultimately 
requested that the charges against Wheeler be entered nolle prosequi, after Chad made 
clear that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to testify in the proceedings.  
The prosecutor’s request was granted.  
 In March of 2014, Wheeler filed this suit in federal court.  He alleged that he was 
the victim of an assault and battery by Chad, and he further alleged substantive due 
process violations by Strelish individually and in an official capacity, citing 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  Strelish moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.  The District 
Court granted that motion but gave Wheeler leave to amend.4  He did so and reframed his 
§ 1983 claims against Strelish as being for Fourth Amendment and due process violations 
based on malicious prosecution and false arrest, though he continued to press what is 
arguably a more general due process claim.  Strelish filed another motion to dismiss, 
again for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The District Court 
                                              
3 Chad was charged with both second and third degree misdemeanor simple 
assault, while Wheeler was charged with only third degree misdemeanor simple assault.  
 
4 By consent of the parties, the matter was adjudicated by a magistrate judge.   
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granted that motion and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claims 
against Chad.       
This timely appeal followed.  
II.  Discussion5 
 Wheeler contends that the District Court erred in dismissing his claims against 
Trooper Strelish.  Our review of the order of dismissal is plenary.  Kaymark v. Bank of 
Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 A. The Court Properly Dismissed Wheeler’s Fourth Amendment Claims  
  Based on Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest6 
 
 In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we consider the well-pleaded allegations of the 
complaint,7 accepting factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff.  Id. at 174.  “We are not compelled to accept unsupported 
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
                                              
 5 Being primarily a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this case was 
subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
6 Wheeler’s complaint that he suffered malicious prosecution and false arrest in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
provides, in relevant part,  
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State … subjects … any citizen of the United 
States … to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress … .  
   
7 As noted later, infra n.10, we may also rely, when relevant, on any documents 
incorporated into the complaint by reference and any matters of public record.  Sands v. 
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).    
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allegation.”  Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations 
omitted).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Fleisher 
v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  To state such a “plausible” claim, a plaintiff must 
plead sufficient facts to permit a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence establishing each element of the relevant cause of action – in this case malicious 
prosecution and false arrest.   
 “To prove malicious prosecution … a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant 
initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the 
defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted 
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the 
plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a 
consequence of a legal proceeding.”  Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 
2007).  The District Court dismissed Wheeler’s complaint based on a failure to plead 
facts supporting a lack of probable cause, and we likewise focus on that element, which is 
dispositive of both the malicious prosecution and false arrest allegations.8  
                                              
8 Because a lack of probable cause is an element of the prima facie case that 
Wheeler must establish, whether couched in terms of malicious prosecution or false 
arrest, and because the absence of that element is as fatal to the false-arrest variety of his 
Fourth Amendment claim, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must 
establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable 
cause.”), as it is the malicious-prosecution variety, we address only the latter.  Although 
the existence of probable cause in a suit such as this is generally a question for the jury, 
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 Wheeler was required to plead facts that make it plausible that Trooper Strelish 
lacked probable cause to arrest him.  While a plaintiff need only plead facts “sufficient to 
show that [he] has ‘a plausible claim for relief,’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)), he cannot 
rest upon “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and a district court 
need not credit such statements.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  Thus, although Wheeler 
asserted in his complaint that Strelish initiated charges “not based upon probable cause,” 
the District Court was under no obligation to accept that legal conclusion as true.  Beyond 
such bald conclusory allegations, Wheeler’s federal claims revolve around how the 
investigation was conducted, yet he makes no allegations that call into question whether 
Strelish had probable cause to arrest him for his role in the altercation.  For example, 
among the facts Wheeler pled about Strelish’s investigation are that Strelish “refused” to 
hear Wheeler and his wife’s story of how the altercation occurred or to visit the scene of 
the incident with Wheeler, (App. at 24a. ¶ 16), or to retrieve Wheeler’s medical records, 
and that he threatened to have Wheeler “evaluated” for asking about the charges that 
Chad would face, (Id. at 24a. ¶ 17).9  None of those factual assertions, even if true, 
                                                                                                                                                  
“a district court may conclude that probable cause exists as a matter of law if the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary 
factual finding … .”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 
2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
9 Wheeler also goes on, at length, about Strelish’s alleged reduction of the 
“charge” against Chad.  That focus is curious, as there is no explanation, either in the 
complaint or in the appellate briefing, of how the charges brought against Chad in any 
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suggest that Strelish lacked probable cause to believe that Wheeler had committed the 
offenses with which he was charged.  Probable cause requires only that Strelish had 
concluded there was “a probability or substantial chance” of the criminal activity in 
question.  United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  
The judicial record in Wheeler’s criminal case further undermines his argument.    
The District Court properly took judicial notice of the state court docket in the very 
prosecution Wheeler claims was malicious.10  That record shows that, following the 
preliminary hearing, Wheeler’s prosecution was scheduled for trial.  In determining 
whether a case will proceed in Pennsylvania, one of the judicial tasks at the preliminary 
hearing is to determine “whether there is a prima facie case that (1) an offense has been 
committed and (2) the defendant has committed it.”  234 Pa. Code § 542(D).  That 
standard is akin to the standard for probable cause, which requires only that a “reasonable 
person [would] believe that an offense has been … committed by the person … arrested.”  
Merkle, 211 F.3d at 788 (internal quotation omitted).  Consequently, the Pennsylvania 
                                                                                                                                                  
way affected Strelish’s probable cause calculus as it relates to the arrest and prosecution 
of Wheeler. 
 
10 While a District Court is generally limited to a plaintiff’s complaint in assessing 
a motion to dismiss, it may take judicial notice of public records, including records of 
judicial proceedings.  Sands, 502 F.3d at 268.  More specifically, when a document is 
“integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint [, it] may be considered without 
converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment.”  In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Because Wheeler’s complaint alleges that his state prosecution was malicious, 
the District Court was permitted to consider the documentation of court action in that 
prosecution in assessing the motion to dismiss.   
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court’s decision to schedule Wheeler for trial is evidence of an independent, 
contemporaneous judicial determination that there was sufficient probable cause to justify 
trying Wheeler for assault and harassment.     
In contrast, Wheeler has not alleged any facts that would give the District Court, 
or us, any reason to question Strelish’s probable cause conclusion.  That being so, the 
District Court was right to conclude that Wheeler failed to adequately plead the “lack of 
probable cause” element of his Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and false arrest 
claim.  
 B. The District Court Properly Dismissed Wheeler’s  
  Fourteenth Amendment Claim 
Wheeler also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process claim.  The most straightforward reading of 
Wheeler’s complaint is that his substantive due process claim is a restating of his 
allegations of malicious prosecution and false arrest.11  The less repetitive but more 
confounding reading (asserted on appeal as a clarification of how the complaint is “meant 
to read”) is that there was some substantive due process violation based on a deprivation 
of Wheeler’s “liberty interest in his personal security and well-being.”  (Opening Br. at 
22)  However interpreted, the claim lacks merit.   
 Looking first to Wheeler’s allegation of a substantive due process violation based 
on the Fourth Amendment claim we have just discussed, it is plain that the claim fares no 
                                              
11 This argument appears only in the original complaint, which was dismissed in 
response to Strelish’s first 12(b)(6) motion on June 24, 2014.  The relevant claim was 
reframed in the amended complaint to reflect a Fourth Amendment violation.   
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better in Fourteenth Amendment garb.  The Supreme Court has noted that, “[w]here a 
particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection 
against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more 
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these 
claims.”  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).  
More specifically, redress for alleged false arrest or malicious prosecution “cannot be 
based on substantive due process considerations, but instead must be based on a provision 
of the Bill of Rights” such as the Fourth Amendment.  Merkle, 211 F.3d at 792.   
  The alternative reading of Wheeler’s substantive due process claim – the “personal 
security and well-being” reading put forth on appeal (Opening Br. at 22) – is similarly 
unsupported in law.  The only case cited by Wheeler for the idea that there exists a 
freestanding “personal security and well-being” liberty interest is inapposite, as it relates 
to the unique circumstance in which a state has a juvenile in its custody and an attendant 
obligation to care for that juvenile.  A.M. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 
572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004).  The due process concerns in such a circumstance are not 
implicated in a run-of-the-mill assault charge prosecution that, from the record, appears 
to have included not a single moment of actual detention.  As a result, the dismissal of 
Wheeler’s substantive due process claim was appropriate.12 
                                              
 12 Wheeler also complains about the District Court’s decision to dismiss his 
pendant state law claims. As Wheeler correctly notes, though, any jurisdiction the District 
Court would have over his state law claims would be under its discretionary jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  The statute is unequivocal that a court may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “the district court has dismissed all claims over 
which it has original jurisdiction.”  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  “We review the District 
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III.  Conclusion 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over state law claims] for abuse of 
discretion.”  Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Wheeler’s only argument on this issue is that the underlying dismissal of his federal 
claims was erroneous, and thus the dismissal of the state law claims was similarly in 
error.  Because we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the federal claims, and 
Wheeler points to no other potential abuse of the Court’s discretion, we also affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Wheeler’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).    
   
